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HOPKINS v. MAGRUDER

DEDUCTIBILITY OF VALUE OF DOWER INTEREST
FROM VALUE OF TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES
IN COMPUTATION OF GIFT TAX
Hopkins v. Magruder, Collector 1

In December, 1934, the plaintiff conveyed to himself
and his wife as tenants by the entireties, subject to a life
estate in his mother, fee-simple property located in Maryland. Prior to this conveyance the plaintiff alone held the
fee-simple title, subject to the life estate. Under Section
501 of the Revenue Act of 1932, as amended,2 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that there was a
taxable gift and assessed a tax with respect thereto. The
plaintiff-taxpayer paid the tax and then brought suit
against the Collector claiming that he was entitled to a refund because the value of the transfer as a gift had not
been properly computed.
The Treasury Regulations, pertinent to the questions
involved, provide that: "If a husband with his own funds
purchases property and has the title thereto conveyed to
himself and his wife as tenants by the entireties, and under
the law of the jurisdiction governing the rights of the
tenants, there is no right of severance by which either of
the tenants acting alone, can defeat the right of the survivor to the whole of the property, there is a gift to the
wife in an amount to be determined by adding to the value
of her right, if any, under the law of such jurisdiction to a
share of the income or other enjoyment of the property
during the joint lives of herself and her husband, the value
of her right to the whole of the property should she survive him, the value of each such rights to be determined in
accordance with the Actuaries' or Combined Experience
Table of Mortality, as extended."3
The basis of plaintiff's claim was that the wife had
acquired by marriage a dower interest in the property
and that this interest should be allowed as a deduction in
computing the value of the gift on which the tax was assessed.4 The lower Court held that the tax was properly
134 F. Supp. 381 (D. C. Md., 1940); 122 F. (2d) 693 (C. C. A. 4th,
1941).
247 Stat. 245, 26 U. S. C. 550.
'Treasury Regulations 79, Art. 2 (7) ; see also Art. 19(8).
For purposes of deduction, plaintiff contended that the value of his
wife's dower right could be calculated in accordance with Rule 21 of the
Rules of the Circuit Courts of Baltimore City, Md. Code (1939) Art. 16,
Sec. 48.
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assessed and that the wife's dower interest was not allowable as a deduction in computing the value of the gift. On
appeal, the judgment was affirmed.5
The two decisions were based on entirely different
grounds and as the opinion of the District Court dealt more
extensively with tax law it will be treated in greater detail.
The Government's position was based on three contentions. First, that no deduction should be allowed since
dower does not attach to a reversionary interest. The
Court pointed out that under the Maryland law the contrary is true, citing Chew v. Chew6 and Shriver v. Shriver.
Second, that the transfer here involved gave to plaintiff
and his wife each an undivided whole of the property in
reversion, whereas prior to the transfer the plaintiff had
only an expectancy. In stating the Government's second
contention, substantially as above, the Court obviously
meant to say that prior to the conveyance the plaintiff's
wife had only an expectancy. This contention seems to
support the imposition of a gift tax on the transfer since it
states that the donee-wife got a greater interest by virtue
of the transfer. Yet implicit in the contention is the proposition that what the wife was given was her estate as
tenant by the entireties less what she already had, an expectancy, i. e., her dower right. The contention does not
support the Government's position that the value of the
expectancy should not be allowed as a deduction. On this
point, the Court said, ". . . the fact that the wife's dower
interest had previously been created, namely, by her marriage to the plaintiff, and therefore had previously attached
to the property, does not justify making a deduction for its
value."8 Quaere: Assuming dower has a value, why is a
deduction not justified? The Government's third contention was that dower is an inchoate right, not capable of
separate conveyance and may not therefore be given a
value for purposes of deduction under the tax statute here
involved. Until the death of the husband, a wife's dower
right is inchoate and it cannot be deeded away by separate
conveyance. Yet because the right of dower possesses
these characteristics, does it necessarily follow that it can
be assigned no value for purposes of deduction from the
basis of a tax assessment? If dower can be valued for
5122 F. (2d) 693 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941).
S1 Md. 163 (1851).
127 Md. 486, 96 A. 615 (1915).
8
Supra, n. 1, 34 F. Supp. 384.
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other purposes, why should it not be valued in this case?'
According to the Court, the tax computation was made
".. . upon the present worth of the wife's right to onehalf of the use of the whole property (plus the present
worth of the right to receive the whole property should
she survive her husband also) . . ."10 This computation
accords with the Treasury Regulations on the subject.
The Court then went on to say that the gift was computed
to embrace only rights which the wife actually possessed,
". . rights that had present worth; whereas an inchoate
dower interest has no present worth."" The present worth
of a right of survivorship in a tenancy by the entireties
would seem to be as difficult to determine as the present
worth of an inchoate dower interest (conceding that for
the same piece of property the extent of value of the latter
interest would be much smaller). Taxation has often been
stated to be a practical matter. As a practical matter, if
the wife predeceases her spouse, the value of her potential
right to take the whole property will be the same as the
value of her dower right. The Supreme Court has said:
"The constitutionality of an exercise of the taxing power
of Congress is not to be determined by such shadowy and
intricate distinctions of common law property concepts
and ancient fictions.' 12 The same statement might be appropriately made with respect to the operation and administration of a tax law.
The judgment against the plaintiff-taxpayer was affirmed on appeal but the decision rested not on principles
of taxation but on the ground that dower does not attach
to a reversionary interest. The Circuit Court of Appeals
did not agree with the District Court's interpretation of
the Chew and Shriver cases.'3 However, it is not the
province of this casenote to discuss this point.
I A casenote in (1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 519, noting the principal case,
takes the same position. There the writer argues that, in computing the
taxable value of the gift, "the practical difference in market value attributable to W's antecedent dower interest" should be recognized. "This
difference can be ascertained with reasonable accuracy by the use of
mortality tables."
10 Supra, n. 1, 34 F.
Supp. 384. Cf. Banking and Trust Co. v. Neilson,
164 Md. 8, 164 A. 157 (1932) as to whether a wife has any separable share
in the lifetime enjoyment of a tenancy by the entireties.
11Supra, n. 1, 34 F. Supp. 384. See Reiff v. Horst, 55 Md. 42 (1880).
12 U. S. v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 363 (1939).
13 Supra, n. 5, 122 F. (2d) 693.
The Circuit Court, after quoting Kent
and Minor, said: "The authorities relied upon by the taxpayer . . . do not
convince us that the rule of law as stated by Minor and Kent is wrong
. . . under the common law as applied in Maryland the wife of the taxpayer had no dower right in the real estate conveyed."
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In considering and commenting on judicial decisions
concerning taxation, there is a tendency to criticize the
courts for apparently ignoring inconsistencies and inequities which are present in the varying applications of the
taxing statutes. Cases on taxation usually reach the courts
on the objection that a particular application of a tax law
violates the Constitution. Because a tax law is harsh or
because its operation is logically irreconcilable with other
legal principles does not mean that the law is unconstitutional. As stated in U. S. v. Jacobs: "The wisdom of both
the tax and of its measurement was for Congress to determine."' 4 The student of taxation should always keep this
customary judicial approach in mind.
In the instant case the Treasury Regulations represent
a detail which Congress has allowed the Bureau of Internal Revenue to determine. Section 501 of the Revenue
Act of 1932 provides merely that "If a gift is made in property, the value thereof at the date of the gift shall be considered the amount of the gift." So it seems that the question here is not one of constitutionality but rather a question of the validity of the Regulation in light of the above
section. The force and effect to be given to such regulations where the statute is silent has been the subject of
much discussion. This is particularly true where a regulation construing an act has continued in effect during a
reenactment of the statute construed. 6 The better view
seems to be that although interpretative regulations are
entitled to great weight they should not be regarded as
conclusive. Whether or not a particular regulation should
be given effect is essentially a problem of administration
rather than of law "and the key to the problems that arise
should be sought through the approach of sound tax administration.' '16 Viewed in this light, are the regulations,
involved in the instant case, sound? It is submitted that
the regulations are valid as far as they go. It should be
noted that they are silent on the question of a possible deduction for a previously acquired dower right. The following argument has been advanced to support the decision forbidding this deduction. If the plaintiff's contention had been sustained the valuation of any gift from one
Maryland spouse to the other would have to be reduced by
1" Supra, n.

12.
15 Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem (1941) 54 Harv. L.
Rev. 398. See also Brown, Regulations, Reenactment, And the Revenue
Acts (1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 377.
10 Griswold, supra, n. 15, 423.
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the value of the expectancy which the donee spouse has
under the Maryland law. It is submitted that this would
be a proper method of assessing a gift tax. A tax on gifts
is a tax on gratuitous transfers of property from one person to another. Where the donee already has an interest
in the property transferred, it seems only right that the
value of this interest be deducted from the total value ofthe subject of the gift.
In the principal case, the District Court relied on the
decision in Thompson, Petitioner, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 17 In that case it was held that where a
wife gave property to her children, the husband's release
of his curtesy interest did not constitute a separate gift
and the whole value of the property was taxable to the
wife. To prevent the attempted evasion the Board of Tax
Appeals held that the release of an inchoate curtesy interest did not constitute a gift. The question was who was
going to pay the tax on the transfer of property and not, as
in the principal case, what was the value of the property
passing to the donee? The argument relied on in the
Thompson case and considered applicable to the situation
presented to the Court in the Hopkins case, was that if a
deduction was allowed for dower or curtesy interests then
it would follow that if one spouse purchased land the
dower or curtesy interest thereby acquired by the other
spouse would constitute a taxable gift. This is not necessarily true since in such a case there would not be any
intent to make a gift and it would seem extremely doubtful whether there would be a transfer.
Apart from the problem of retroactivity, the most
troublesome question in tax cases involving dower interests and tenancies by the entireties is the problem of how
to properly calculate the value of the gift on transfer. In
the principal case the plaintiff, on the authority of Lilly v.
Smith, 8 conceded that a transfer to himself and his wife
as tenants by the entireties constituted a taxable gift
under the statute. In that case the husband supplied the
consideration and the transfer was from a third party to
the husband and wife, consequently the question concerning a deduction for a previously acquired dower right was
not raised. The value of the taxable gift was computed
B. T. A. 793 (1938).
F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938) ; cert. den. 305 U. S. 604 (1938)
motion for rehearing denied 307 U. S. 651 (1938). To the same effect is
Commissioner v. Hart, 106 F. (2d) 269 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
1737

1a 96
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in the manner prescribed by the Regulations.19 If no question concerning dower is involved, this method seems just
and proper.
Under Federal Estate Tax statutes it has been held in
the case of Tyler v. U. S.,20 that where an entireties estate
in stock is created after the passage of the tax act the
whole value of the property should be included in the
gross estate. The taxpayer contended that by the inclusion of the whole value the tax amounted to a direct tax
on one-half of the property and was invalid, therefore,
because not apportioned. The Court there said that the
tax was a death duty and that, disregarding property fictions, death caused an actual shifting of economic benefits
to the surviving spouse which Congress could constitutionally tax. The Supreme Court later held that the same
method of valuation was applicable to an entireties estate
created prior to passage of the taxing statute. 1 Of course,
the part of the value of any joint estate contributed by the
survivor is not included in the decedent's gross estate.2 2 In
the Lilly case, the Court felt that the estate tax valuation
assessed in the Tyler case (where the whole property was
included) was inconsistent with the assessment of a gift
tax on only one-half the value of the estate. The Court
justified any inconsistency with the statement that "...
the Government's right to tax is not dependent upon the
well-recognized origin and characteristics of an estate by
the entirety. ' 23 It is only natural that, although estate
taxes and gift taxes are both excises, the differences in the
events which are made the occasion for a tax will result in
different applications of the taxing statutes.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the decision in the
instant case is not logical, and that a contrary result would
not unduly increase the administrative burden of the tax
collector. The interpretation supported by the courts
herein may be constitutional and yet not be a wise interpretation of the intent of the gift tax statute.
10Supra, n. 3.
20

281 U. S. 497 (1930).

21 Third National Bank v. White, 45 F. (2d) 911; affirmed 287 U. S. 577;

Helvering v. Bowers, 303 U. S. 618 (1937). Joint tenancies are treated
the same as tenancies by the entireties.
22 Section 302 (e) as amended by Sec. 404 of the Revenue Act of 1934;
Regulations 80, Arts. 22, 23.
23

Supra, n. 18.

